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Hohn: Hohn: Missouri Firefighter's Rule

The Missouri Firefighter's RuleGray v. Russell'
I. INTRODUCTION

The firefighter's rule bars injured firefighters and police officers from
recovering against individuals whose ordinary negligence created the situation
that required the presence of the officer or firefighter.2 In Missouri, the
firefighter's rule originated as a landowner liability rule and as an exception
to the rescue doctrine More recently, however, the rule has been influenced
by the doctrine of assumption of risk and by public policy concerns. The
result has been a hodgepodge of old and new rationales that form the basis for
an inconsistent rule that relies on superfluous analysis.4 In Gray v. Russell,5
the Missouri Supreme Court reasserted the firefighter's rule's basis in the

rescue doctrine, and thereby prevented a beneficial change in analysis.6
II. FACTS AND HOLDING
Roy and Martha Gray filed a personal injury suit against the Russells,
doing business as Russell's Variety Store.7 On September 30, 1988, Gray,
while performing his duties as a police officer, conducted a routine inspection
of the building owned by the Russells.' As part of this inspection, Gray
checked the loading dock behind the building and then descended the wooden
steps from the dock.9 The steps collapsed, and Gray injured his neck and
back.'0

* For a good discussion of this area prior to Grayv. Russell see Louie A. Wright,
Note, The Missouri "Fireman'sRule": An UnprincipledRule in Search of a Theory,
58 U.M.K.C. L. REV. 329 (1990).
1. 853 S.W.2d 928 (Mo. 1993).
2. Berko v. Freda, 459 A.2d 663, 663-64 (N.J. 1983).
3. See Nastasio v. Cinnamon, 295 S.W.2d 117, 120-21 (Mo. 1956); Anderson v.
Cinnamon, 282 S.W.2d 445, 448 (Mo. 1955).
4. Gray, 853 S.W.2d at 930.
5. 853 S.W.2d 928 (Mo. 1993).
6. Id. at 930.
7. Id. at 929.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Gray v. Russell, No. WD 45607, 1992 WL 237617, at *1 (Mo. Ct. App. Sept.
29, 1992), rev'd, 853 S.W.2d 928 (Mo. 1993).
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The Grays alleged that the Russells negligently failed to maintain the
steps in a reasonably safe condition and that they knew or should have known
of such condition." The Russells filed a motion for summary judgment,
arguing that the firefighter's rule barred the Grays' action. Adopting the
Russells' argument, the trial court granted summary judgment in their
favor. 2 The Grays appealed to the Western District of the Missouri Court
of Appeals. Finding that the Grays' action fell within an exception to the
firefighter's rule, the court of appeals reversed. 3 The Missouri Supreme
Court subsequently granted transfer.
The Missouri Supreme Court reversed the summary judgment and
remanded the case to the trial court, holding that the firefighter's rule applies
only in emergency situations. 4
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. Early Development of the Firefighter'sRule
Since its birth over a century ago in the seminal case of Gibson v.

16
Leonard, the firefighter's rule has gained almost universal acceptance.

In Gibson, the Illinois Supreme Court held that firefighters were licensees and
thus were owed no duty of care by a landowner, except to refrain from willful

11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id at *2-3.
14. Gray, 853 S.W.2d at 931-32.
15. 32 N.E. 182 (Ill. 1892), overruledby Dini v. Naiditch, 170 N.E.2d 881 (II1.
1960). For other early firefighter's rule cases finding that firefighters are licensees,
see Lunt v. Post Printing & Publishing Co., 110 P. 203, 207 (Colo. 1910), overruled
by Mile High Fence Co. v. Radovich, 489 P.2d 308, 314 (Colo. 1971); Pincock v.
McCoy, 281 P. 371, 372 (Idaho 1929); Woodruff v. Bowen, 34 N.E. 1113, 1116 (Ind.
1893); Aldworth v. F. W. Woolworth Co., 3 N.E.2d 1008, 100.9 (Mass. 1936);
Hamilton v. Minneapolis Desk Mfg. Co., 80 N.W. 693, 694 (Minn. 1899); New
Omaha Thomson-Houston Elec. Light Co. v. Anderson, 102 N.W. 89, 92-93 (Neb.
1905); Drake v. Fenton, 85 A. 14, 14 (Pa. 1912); Beehler v. Daniels, 29 A. 6, 6 (R.I.
1894); Burroughs Adding Mach. Co. v. Fryar, 179 S.W. 127, 128 (Tenn. 1915),
overruledbyHudson v. Gaitan, 675 S.W.2d 699, 703 (Tenn. 1984), overruledon other
grounds by McIntyre v. Balentine, 833 S.W.2d 52, 56 (Tenn. 1992). See also
Annotation, Duty and Liability of Owner or Occupant of Premises to Fireman or
Policeman Coming Thereon in Dischargeof His Duty, 13 A.L.R. 637 (1921). But see
Meiers v. Fred Koch Brewery, 127 N.E. 491,493 (N.Y. 1920) (holding that firefighter
was not a licensee or a trespasser, but was rightfully on premises and was owed a duty
of reasonable care under all the circumstances).
16. Walters v. Sloan, 571 P.2d 609, 611 (Cal. 1977).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol59/iss2/6
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or affirmative acts.' Because of this minimal duty of care, the firefighters
were effectively barred from suing the negligent landowner for the injuries
they had sustained. 8 Thus, the firefighter's rule first emerged as a per se
landowner liability rule.' 9
Landowner liability rules hinge upon classification of the entrant as a
trespasser, licensee, or invitee, and application of the corresponding duty of
care. The Gibson court could not find a firefighter to be an invitee because
there existed no "'enticement, allurement, or inducement being held out to him

by the owner."'20 Furthermore, the court referred to "'the ancient rule of the
common law"' that one who enters upon the land of another to save life or
Finally, having only one classification
property is not a trespasser."
remaining, the court cited to Cooley on Torts for the rule22 that firefighters

17. Gibson, 32 N.E. at 190-91. Note that the rules of landowner liability have
changed dramatically over the years. Some states have altered the concomitant duties
associated with status as trespasser, licensee, and invitee. Also, some states have
adopted a standard duty of reasonable care for all three classifications or have adopted
a common duty for just licensees and invitees. See Vitauts M. Gulbis, Annotation,
Modern Status of Rules ConditioningLandowner's Liability Upon Status of Injured
Partyas Invitee, Licensee, or Trespasser,22 A.L.R. 4TH 294, 301-10 (1983).

18. Gibson, 32 N.E. at 196.
19. See Anderson v. Cinnamon, 282 S.W.2d 445, 446-47 (Mo. 1955).
20. Gibson, 32 N.E. at 183 (quoting Sweeney v. Old Colony & Newport R.R.,
92 Mass. (10 Allen) 368, 372 (Mass. 1865)). But see Meiers, 127 N.E. at 492 (stating
in dicta that it could be fairly said that there existed an implied invitation for a
firefighter to come onto the premises).
21. Gibson, 32 N.E. at 184 (quoting Proctor v. Adams, 113 Mass. 376 (1873)).
22. Id. at 183-84 (citing THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF
TORTS 313 (1st ed. 1880)). The court referred to the following passage from Cooley
on Torts:

The third class of licensees comprehends those cases in which
the law gives permission to enter a man's premises. This
permission has no necessary connection with the owner's
interest, and is always given on public grounds. An instance is
where a fire breaks out in a city. Here the public authorities,
and even private individuals, may enter upon adjacent premises
as they may find it necessary or convenient in their efforts to
extinguish or to arrest the spread of the flames. The law of
overruling necessity licenses this, and will not suffer the owner
of a lot to stand at its borders and exclude those who would use
his premises as vantage ground in staying the conflagration.
COOLEY, supra at 313.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1994
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Thus, the court arrived at the licensee
were "mere naked licensee[s]."
status for firefighters primarily by default.
This Gibson formulation received some criticism because of its narrow
view of the various classifications of entrants and because it had no authority
for its propositions.24 Nonetheless, almost every state adopted some form of
the firefighter's rule premised upon the firefighter's status as a licensee.2"
Some states, however, chose to classify firefighters as suigeneris, recognizing
26
that such entrants did not fit well into the traditional classifications.
Although the genesis of the firefighter's rule was initially based on
notions of landowner liability, the courts also fashioned this rule as an

23. Gibson, 32 N.E. at 190. See Annotation, supra note 15, at 638 (stating the

majority rule to be that "a member of the public fire department who, in an
emergency, enters on premises in the discharge of his duty, is a mere licensee, under
a commission to enter given by law, to whom the owner or occupant owes no greater
duty than to refrain from the infliction of wilful or intentional injury").
24. See Louie A. Wright, Note, The Missouri "Fireman'sRule": An Unprincipled

Rule in Search of a Theory, 58 U.M.K.C. L. REV. 329, 332-33 n.30 (1990). For a
general criticism of the rule that firefighters are licensees, see Comment, Torts-Are
Firemenand Policemen Licensees or Invitees?, 35 MICH. L. REV. 1157 (1937).

25. In a state with a uniform standard of care towards invitees and licensees, the
firefighter's status as a licensee would not be a bar to recovery, since the firefighter
would be owed the same duty of care as other plaintiffs. The following cases have
adopted uniform standards of care for licensees, invitees, and trespassers: Webb v.
Sitka, 561 P.2d 731, 733 (Alaska 1977); Rowland v. Christian, 443 P.2d 561, 568
(Cal. 1968), supersededby statute asstatedin Perez v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 267
Cal. Rptr. 100, 103 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990); Mile High Fence Co. v. Radovich, 489 P.2d
at 314 (Colo. 1971); Smith v. Arbaugh's Restaurant, Inc., 469 F.2d 97, 105 (D.C. Cir.
1972), cert. denied,412 U.S. 939 (1973); Pickard v. City & County of Honolulu, 452
P.2d 445, 446 (Haw. 1969); Cates v. Beauregard Elec. Coop., Inc., 328 So. 2d 367,
371 (La. 1976), cert. denied,429 U.S. 833 (1976); Limberhand v. Big Ditch Co., 706
P.2d 491 (Mont. 1985); Ouellette v. Blanchard, 364 A.2d 631, 634 (N.H. 1976); Basso
v. Miller, 352 N.E.2d 868, 872 (N.Y. 1976); Mariorenzi v. Joseph Di Ponte, Inc., 333
A.2d 127, 133 (R.I. 1975).
The following cases have adopted a uniform standard of care for licensees and
invitees: Wood v. Camp, 284 So. 2d 691, 695 (Fla. '1973); Poulin v. Colby College,
402 A.2d 846, 851 & n.5 (Me. 1979); Mounsey v. Ellard, 297 N.E.2d 43, 51 & n.7
(Mass. 1973); Peterson v. Balach, 199 N.W.2d 639, 647 (Minn. 1972); O'Leary v.
Coenen, 251 N.W.2d 746, 751 (N.D. 1977); Hudson v. Gaitan, 675 S.W.2d 699, 70304 (Tenn. 1984); Anotoniewicz v. Reszcynski, 236 N.W.2d 1, 11-12 (Wis. 1975).
Cf Young v. Ferguson, 724 P.2d 991, 995 (Wash. 1986) (refusing to adopt
uniform standard of care); Lohrenz v. Lane, 787 P.2d 1274, 1277 (Okla. 1990) (same).

26. See Buren v. Midwest Indus., Inc., 380 S.W.2d 96, 97 (Ky. 1964); Krauth
v. Geller, 157 A.2d 129, 130 (N.J. 1960).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol59/iss2/6
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Developed in order to ensure that
exception to the rescue doctrine.
proximate cause analysis would not prevent a rescuer from recovering in
tort,28 the rescue doctrine provides that one who negligently imperils another
may also be liable to a third party who sustains injuries while attempting to
30
rescue the imperiled individual.29 So long as the rescue is not "wanton,
the rescuer is deemed a foreseeable plaintiff for proximate cause purposes.3
Despite this imputed foreseeability for rescuers, Missouri and other states
have withheld the application of the rescue doctrine to firefighters and police
officers for public policy reasons.32 Specifically, the Missouri Supreme
Court has announced that these "professional rescuers" must face these dangers
as part of their public duty and, therefore, should be barred from recovery in
tort.33
Whether examining the firefighter's rule in terms of landowner liability
or in terms of the rescue doctrine, the result is identical: firefighters are owed
no duty of care while acting within their firefighting or rescue capacities.34

27. See infra notes 46-49 and accompanying text.
28. Gray, 853 S.W.2d at 931. "Essentially, the rescue doctrine embodies a policy
choice by courts to deem rescue attempts to be foreseeable for purposes of tort
recovery ...."

Id.

29. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS

§ 44, at 307-08 (5th ed. 1984).

30. Id. "The rule is not limited to spontaneous or instinctive action, but applies
even when there is time for thought. And whether the person injured in the attempt
at rescue is the rescuer, or the person rescued, or a stranger, the original wrongdoer

is still liable." Id. at 308.
31. Id. at 307. As Judge (later Justice) Cardozo declared: "Danger invites rescue
.... The risk of rescue, if only it be not wanton, is bom of the occasion. The

emergency begets the man. The wrongdoer may not have foreseen the coming of a
deliverer. He is accountable as if he had." Wagner v. International Ry., 133 N.E. 437,

437-38 (N.Y. 1921).

32. Gray, 853 S.W.2d at 931.
33. Id.; Nastasio v. Cinnamon, 295 S.W.2d 117, 121 (Mo. 1956). See Berko v.
Freda, 459 A.2d 663, 667 n.2 (N.J. 1983) (stating that the firefighter's rule does not
make a firefighter's rescue unforeseeable, but, because of public policy, the rescue
doctrine simply does not apply).
34. Whereas the rescue doctrine deals with proximate cause analysis, landowner
liability rules examine the duty aspect of the negligence cause of action. Duty and
proximate cause are closely related. KEETON ET AL., supra note 29, § 44, at 274 (the
questions of duty and proximate cause are "one and the same").
Note that in Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928), the
proximate cause analysis was couched in terms of "duty": "The risk reasonably to be
perceived defines the duty to be obeyed, and risk imports relation." Id.at 100
(Cardozo, C.J.). "Every one owes to the world at large the duty of refraining from
those acts that may unreasonably threaten the safety of others." Id.at 103 (Andrews,
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1994
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The reason for this identical result was alluded to by the California Supreme
Court in Walters v. Sloan: 5

[T]he fireman's rule is based on a principle as fundamental to
our law today as it was centuries ago. The principle is not
unique to landowner cases but is applicable to our entire system
of justice-one who has knowingly and voluntarily confronted
a hazard cannot recover for injuries sustained thereby. 6

The California Supreme Court added that "'in the final analysis the policy
decision is that it would be too burdensome to charge all who carelessly cause
or fail to prevent fires with the injuries suffered by the expert retained with
public funds ...."
Courts have used justifications such as landowner
classifications and the exception to the rescue doctrine to hide their common
goal of fairness and public policy that have truly supported the rule.

B. The MissouriFirefighter'sRule
Missouri first adopted the firefighter's rule in the companion cases of
Anderson v. Cinnamon38 and Nastasio v. Cinnamon.39 In these cases,
several firefighters were injured while fighting a fire at the defendant's
apartment building when the porch on which they were standing collapsed.4"
Both plaintiffs brought personal injury actions against the landowner, and both
suits were barred by the firefighter's rule.4'
The Anderson court, despite discussing cases that regarded firefighters as
sui generis, declared that firefighters were licensees.42 Furthermore, the

J., dissenting).
35. 571 P.2d 609 (Cal. 1977). The court in Walters did not have the landowner
liability doctrine with which to support the firefighter's rule. In Rowland v. Christian,
443 P.2d 561 (Cal. 1968), the California Supreme Court abolished entrant classifications in favor of a uniform standard of care. Id. at 568. The Walters court found that
the changes brought about by Rowland did not relate to the firefighter's rule. Walters,
571 P.2d at 612. Furthermore, the court found several public policy reasons that
independently supported the rule, and thus the court upheld the rule. Id. at 612-14.
36. Walters, 571 P.2d at 611.
37. Id.at 612 (quoting Krauth v. Geller, 157 A.2d 129, 130 (N.J. 1960)).
38. 282 S.W.2d 445 (Mo. 1955).
39. 295 S.W.2d 117 (Mo. 1956).
40. Anderson, 282 S.W.2d at 446.

41. "Although the words 'fireman's rule' do not appear in the opinion, the
[Anderson] case does apply the fireman's rule in Missouri." Phillips v. Hallmark
Cards, Inc., 722 S.W.2d 86, 89 (Mo. 1986).
42. Anderson, 282 S.W.2d at 447.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol59/iss2/6
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court held that the landowner owes no duty to licensees as to maintenance of
the premises, "except for wantonness or some form of intentional wrong or
active negligence of the possessor"43 or for "'knowingly let[ting] him go

into a hidden peril.""' Finally, the Court held that
where it is not alleged that the possessor of land was informed
that firemen intended to enter and use the porch of his building
with their fire-fighting equipment before they went on it, he
cannot be held liable for failure to warn them to leave it after he
knew of their presence there.45
Unlike his predecessor in Anderson, the plaintiff in Nastasio framed his
argument in terms of the rescue doctrine. 46 The court opined that the plaintiff
performed the duties that he was compensated to perform; hence, the act of

43. Id. Missouri has since changed the duty owed to licensees. In Wells v.
Goforth, 443 S.W.2d 155, 158 (Mo. 1969), the court expressly adopted the RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 342 (1934). Section 342 holds a possessor liable to a licensee for
harm caused by a nonobvious natural or artificial condition if (1)the possessor knows
of the condition; (2) realizes that the condition poses an unreasonable risk of harm; and
(3) fails to remedy the condition or warn the licensee of the risk. Id.
44. Anderson, 282 S.W.2d at 448 (quoting Gilliand v. Bondurant, 59 S.W.2d 679,
687 (Mo. 1933)). Wanton conduct, intentional wrongs, active negligence, and hidden
dangers became exceptions to the firefighter's rule. See Lambert v. Schaefer, 839
S.W.2d 27, 29 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992).
45. Anderson, 282 S.W.2d at 450-51. Because the plaintiff in Anderson alleged
that the defendant knew of the unsafe and unstable condition of the porch and that the
defendant was present at the scene of the fire and could have warned the plaintiff of
the condition, the court had to resolve the question of whether there existed a duty to
warn of a hidden danger. Id. at 447-50.
The court justified its conclusion that firefighters are licensees and not owed a
duty to be warned of all dangerous conditions on the premises by arguing in dicta that
such a duty would impose too great a burden on landowners, since one would not
know when firefighters might come, or where they might go. Also, the court stated
that such warnings would interfere with the firefighters' operations. Id. at 448.
46. Nastasio, 295 S.W.2d at 119. "The rescue doctrine is a legal shorthand for
a particular factual situation in which courts find the foreseeability requirement
satisfied. In those factual circumstances where one is injured while attempting a
rescue, the negligence creating the peril requiring rescue is held to be the proximate
cause of the rescuer's injury." Krause v. U.S. Truck Co., Inc., 787 S.W.2d 708, 71011 (Mo. 1990). The Missouri "rescue doctrine" applies to rescues of persons only.
Boyd v. Terminal R.R. Ass'n, 289 S.W.2d 33, 37 (Mo. 1956). Some jurisdictions
have extended the rescue doctrine to include rescues of property as well. See, e.g.,
KEETON ET AL., supra note 29, § 44, at 308.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1994
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rescue was not "'the child of the occasion."' 47 Thus, foreshadowing future
policy arguments justifying the firefighter's rule, the court held that the
firefighter's actions did not "bring him within the scope of the 'rescue
doctrine"' because it was his duty to the public to take "'the risk of rescue.""'4 After concluding that the plaintiff did not come within the scope of
the rescue doctrine, the court then relied on the Anderson holding to affirm the
dismissal of the plaintiff's petition.49
Consistent with other jurisdictions, the Missouri Supreme Court outlined
various exceptions to the firefighter's rule. In Bartels v. Continental Oil
Company," the court flushed out the hidden danger exception. 5' Bartels
involved a fire at four storage tanks that held kerosene and gasoline.52 While
firefighters were at the scene, one of the tanks exploded, killing the plaintiff
and many others. 53 The court cited with approval the rule "'that an owner
or occupant of premises which firemen enter upon in the discharge of their
duty may be held liable to fireman injured by a hidden danger on the
premises, where the owner or occupant knew of the danger and had an
opportunity to warn the firemen of it.'

'54

Furthermore, the court said that

"'[a]Ithough firemen assume the usual risks incident to their entry upon
premises... they should [not] be required to assume the extraordinary risk
of hidden perils of which they might easily be warned."' 5

47. Nastasio,295 S.W.2d at 121 (quoting Wagner v. International Ry., 133 N.E.
437, 438 (N.Y. 1921)).
48. Id.

49. Id.
50. 384 S.W.2d 667 (Mo. 1964).
51. Id. at 670. See also Wright, supra note 24, at 337-39 (discussing how
NastasioandAndersonavoided the hidden danger exception through "a marvelous feat
of judicial sleight of hand").
52. Bartels, 384 S.W.2d at 668.
53. Id. at 669.
54. Id. at 670 (quoting 86 A.L.R. 2d 1214). This rule strays somewhat from the
Anderson holding, since the defendant in that case had "the opportunity" to warn, but
he was not given notice of the firefighters' intention to go onto the hidden danger
(porch) before they did so. The Anderson court did not find the structurally defective
porch to be a hidden danger for which a warning was required. Anderson, 282 S.W.2d
at 448.
As one author suggests, the Bartels rule emerges looking like what Judge
Westhues suggested in his dissents in Anderson and Nastasio. A landowner will no
longer be able to sit idly by and watch as firefighters enter upon a hidden danger
simply because he was not notified of their intention beforehand. The defendant in
Anderson must now make some effort to warn of the unsafe porch. See Wright, supra
note 24, at 339-40.
55. Bartels, 384 S.W.2d at 670 (quoting Shypulski v. Waldorf Paper Prod. Co.,
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol59/iss2/6
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In Phillips v. Hallmark Cards, Inc.,56 the court recognized the modem
underpinnings of the firefighter's rule, breaking the rule free from the
strictures of landowner liability and the rescue doctrine. 7 Referring
favorably to a Maryland case, 8 the court discussed assumption of risk and
numerous public policy rationales that independently support the rule. 9
First, the court said "that because it is the firefighter's duty to cope with the
hazards inherent in this dangerous line of work, one should not complain
Second, the court announced that
when injured in the line of duty."'
"'especially hazardous governmental functions, such as firefighting and
policing, are the collective responsibility of society as a whole and are not
functions relegated to dependence upon ordinary tort recovery."' 6
Adding its own analysis, the court further argued that the tort process is
not compatible with firefighter injuries and that firefighters should be
compensated through public funds. 2 The court found that firefighters do not
enter their profession as other employees do, with the expectation that the
Rather, they are expected to encounter
work premises will be safe.6'
dangerous situations, oftentimes created by negligent individuals.' The court
concluded that "[p]ermitting a cause of action for negligence for injuries to
firemen in the course of their duties would place unreasonable burdens on
every owner or occupier of property."6 5 Not having been "persuaded to
abrogate the fireman's rule," the court determined that the plaintiff could not
recover.6

45 N.W.2d 549, 553 (Minn. 1951)). The court affirmed the trial court's judgment for
the plaintiffs, the heirs of the firefighter, finding that the firefighters did not know that
the tank would explode as it did. Id. at 671-73.
56. 722 S.W.2d 86 (Mo. 1986).
57. Id.
at 88-89.
58. Flowers v. Sting Security, Inc., 488 A.2d 523 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1985),
aff'd sub nom. Flowers v. Rock Creek Terrace Ltd. Partnership, 520 A.2d 361 (Md.

1987).
59. Phillips, 722 S.W.2d at 88 (citing Flowers, 488 A.2d. at 527, 532). See
Flowers, 488 A.2d at 532 ("[A]s more modem tort law makes overwhelmingly clear
...the Fireman's Rule by no means rests exclusively, or even predominantly, upon
that older rationale, [landowner liability]. The major modem justification for the
Fireman's Rule is based upon the notion of assumption of risk.").

60. Phillips,722 S.W.2d at 88.
61. Id.(quoting Flowers, 488 A.2d at 534).

62.
63.
64.
65.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

66. Id.at 89. Although the court was not "persuaded to abrogate the fireman's
rule," it failed to explicate an appropriate standard. The Phillips court referred to
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1994
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Confronted with the option to expand or limit the scope of this newly
justified firefighter's rule, the Missouri Supreme Court chose to do both in
Krause v. U.S. Truck Co., Inc.67 In Krause, an ambulance attendant was
killed while attempting a rescue at the scene of an automobile accident.68
Finding that firefighters and police officers have the "primarypublic duty to
confront danger," the court declined to extend the rule to cover ambulance
attendants."
However, the court also expanded the rule by declaring a formulation that
does not restrict the protection of the firefighter's rule to owners and occupiers
of land.7" This was a noticeable departure from prior precedent that
predicated the firefighter's rule on landowner liability. A firefighter is barred
from bringing suit against any negligent person, not just a landowner, whose
ordinary negligence created the emergency.7

Anderson, but failed to recognize the change of the duty owed to licensees since the
Anderson decision. Wright, supra note 24, at 341-43.
Although the court discussed Anderson and landowner liability as a rationale for
the firefighter's rule, it seemed to do so almost tangentially. The court first analyzed
the public policy rationale supporting the firefighters rule, then discussed the Anderson
decision, and finally concluded by announcing that it was not persuaded. Phillips,722
S.W.2d at 88-89. Considering the court's lengthy exposition of public policy
justifications, arguably such justifications played an integral role in convincing the
court not to abrogate the firefighter's rule.
67. 787 S.W.2d 708 (Mo. 1990).
68. Id.at 710. Note that in Krause, the ambulance attendant was not killed on
another's premises, but rather on a state highway. Id, Premises liability rules would
therefore not apply.
69. Id at 713 (emphasis in original). Although no Missouri case had at this time
extended the firefighter's rule to cover police officers, the court, in dicta, impliedly
supported this extension. The court said that "[t]he fireman's rule is a misnomer. It
has been applied to police officers injured while involved in effecting an arrest ...
[and] to police officers injured while engaged in traffic control at the scene of an
accident". Id.at 711 (citations omitted). The court of appeals recognized police
officers' coverage in Lambert v. Schaefer, 839 S.W.2d 27 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992).
70. The rule in Krause is that "a fireman ... may not recover against the person
whose ordinary negligence created the emergency." Krause, 787 S.W.2d at 711
(emphasis added).
71. The court announced that:
The rule provides that a fireman brought in contact with an
emergency solely by reason of his status as a fireman who is
injured while performing fireman's duties may not recover
against the person whose ordinary negligence created the
emergency. Phillipsv. HallmarkCards,Inc., 722 S.W.2d 86, 87
(Mo. 1986); Nastasio v. Cinnamon,295 S.W.2d 117, 121 (Mo.
1956). The rule excludes firemen from the benefit of the rescue
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol59/iss2/6
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Although the Court cited Phillips and Nastasioto support its pronouncement of the rule, neither case worded the rule in quite this manner." The

Nastasio court couched the rule in terms of landowner liability,

3

and the

Phillips court failed to make a definitive statement of the rule; it merely
referred to cases74 that used landowner liability analysis. In Krause, there is
no mention of entrant classifications.75 Furthermore, the Krause rule
includes the requirement of an "emergency," which was not explicitly stated
in the other formulations of the firefighter's rule.76
With landowner liability analysis no longer forming the basis for the
firefighter's rule, the court "looked elsewhere for a rationale for the fireman's
rule."77 The court retraced its steps in Phillips and examined assumption of
risk78 and public policy grounds.79 First, the court examined assumption of
risk and stated the rule that firefighters "assume all risks incident to
firefighting" duties, except for hidden dangers known by the landowner.80
Subsequently, the court examined the public policy rationales, which they
claimed were "[t]he most persuasive and most nearly universal rationale for
the fireman's rule.""' The court gave the following public policy reasons in

doctrine in most cases.
Id.
Some courts have limited the firefighter's rule to protect only owners and
occupiers of land. See Court v. Grzelinski, 379 N.E.2d 281 (Ill. 1978); Hawkins v.
Sunmark Indus., 727 S.W.2d 397 (Ky. 1986); Lave v. Neumann, 317 N.W.2d 779
(Neb. 1982).
72. In fact, Phillips contains no statement of the rule at all. Gray, 853 S.W.2d
at 930. The Nastasio decision adopts the Anderson formulation of the rule. See supra
text accompanying note 49.
73. Nastasio, 295 S.W.2d at 121.
74. Baxley v. Williams Constr. Co., 106 S.E.2d 799 (Ga. Ct. App. 1958); Strong
v. Seattle Stevedore Co., 466 P.2d 575 (Wash. Ct. App. 1970).
75. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
76. Since the rule was premised upon the rescue doctrine, an emergency would
presumably be a requirement; however, none of the previous statements of the rule in
Missouri explicitly required an emergency for the firefighter's rule to apply.
77. Krause, 787 S.W.2d at 711. The court makes no mention of the rule's
relationship to the rescue doctrine.
78. The court noted that primary, not secondary, assumption of the risk is what
is involved in firefighter rule analysis. "Primary assumption of the risk is not really
an affirmative defense; rather, it indicates that the defendant did not even owe the
plaintiff any duty of care." Id. at 712 (citing Armstrong v. Mailand, 284 N.W.2d 343,
349 (Minn. 1979)).
79. Id. at 711 (citing Phillips, 722 S.W.2d at 87-88).
80. Id. at 712.
81. Id.It seems that the court accepted both assumption of risk and public policy
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support of the rule: (1) "[T]he relation between those persons and the public
specifically calls them to confront certain hazards on behalf of the public;"82
(2) firefighters and police officers are hired, trained and compensated to deal
with dangerous situations;83 (3) one who negligently creates the hazard that
causes the presence of the police or firefighters has no right to control the
firefighter and hence it would be unreasonable to burden landowners and

require them to make their premises safe;84 and (4) workers' compensation
should be utilized to compensate injured firefighters and police officers and
thereby spread costs of injuries across the public.85
The Western District of the Missouri Court of Appeals explored the
various exceptions to the firefighter's rule in Lambert v. Schaefer.86 Citing
Anderson, the Lambert court found that "[t]he exceptions include: (1) acts
involving reckless or wanton negligence or willful conduct; (2) separate and
independent acts; and (3) intentional torts.' 87 In this case, two police officers
were on a routine patrol and were informed of the suspicious behavior of two
youths.88 Upon confronting them, the juveniles shot at the officers, and both
officers brought civil suits against the minors and their parents.89 The court
found that all of the exceptions could apply in this case.9"
In two subsequent cases, the Missouri Court of Appeals strayed from the
"emergency" requirement that was announced in Krause. In Gray v.
Russell,9' the court of appeals flatly rejected the Krause formulation.
[A]ppellants argue that the fireman's rule should only be applied
... [in] an emergency situation. Respondents... argue that the
fireman's rule should not be limited to emergency situations, but
should be applied to all cases where injury is sustained while the

as the underlying rationales for the rule. It found these two rationales "intertwined."
Id.
82. Id,
83. Id.

84. Id.
85. Id.
86. 839 S.W.2d 27 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992).
87. Id. at 29. Besides the hidden danger exception, which was explored in
Anderson and Bartels, the other exceptions to the firefighter's rule had not been
encountered in Missouri case law until Lambert.
88. Id at 28.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 29-30. Although all of the exceptions could have applied, the officers
properly alleged only the intentional torts exception. Id. Therefore, the court affirmed
the dismissal of all but one count of the petition. Id. at 30.
91. Case No. WD 45607, 1992 WL 237617 (Mo. Ct. App. Sept. 29 1992), rev'd,
853 S.W.2d 928 (Mo. 1993).

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol59/iss2/6

12

1994]

Hohn: Hohn: Missouri Firefighter's Rule
MISSOURI FIREFIGHTER'SRULE
fireman or police officer is acting in the scope of his or her
92
employment. We disagree with both positions.

The court of appeals found that the better test of applicability of the rule
would be whether "the risk confronted by the officer is one normally
associated with the duty the officer is performing or the reason for that
officer's presence at the accident scene."93 If not, then it would qualify
under exception two of Lambert as a separate and independent act and would
fall outside the firefighter's rule.' The court essentially eliminated one layer
of analysis by creating this new test. It ignored the emergency element of
Krause and instead looked to the exceptions to the firefighter's rule. Finally,

the court held that the facts of Gray fell within this exception, and thus the

95
officer was not barred from bringing suit.
96
the Eastern District Court of Appeals
In Wagener v. Burmeister,
followed the Western District's lead in Gray. Wagener involved a police
officer who responded to a malfunctioning burglar alarm and tripped over a
97
raised stair as he departed, severely injuring himself. The court interpreted
Krause narrowly and said that it was "tailored to firefighters and seems to base
itself upon the firefighter's status as a firefighter and the emergency nature of
the situation.""8
Citing the Western District's decision in Gray, the court announced that
"[t]he application of the firefighter's rule in cases involving police officers
injured in the line of duty has not rested so heavily on the emergency aspect
'
which has been present in cases involving firefighters." Furthermore, the
court said that it was persuaded by the Western District's rule since it was
easy to apply and avoided the problems of defining an "emergency situation."'0 0 Presumably, the Eastern District left the emergency requirement

intact for application of the rule to firefighters.

92. Id. at *2.
93. Id.
94. Id. This test announced by Lambert is consistent with the approach of other
jurisdictions. See Flowers, 488 A.2d at 535; Berko, 459 A.2d at 665; Rose v. City of
Los Angeles, 206 Cal. Rptr. 49, 51-52 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984).
95. Gray, 1992 WL 237617, at *3.
96. 1993 WL 98195 (Mo.Ct. App. Apr. 6, 1993), rev'd, 853 S.W.2d 928 (Mo.
1993).
97. Id. at *1.
98. Id.
99. Id.at *2.
100. Id.
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Whether intended or not, the Wagener court sanctioned the creation of
two firefighter rules: one for .police officers and one for firefighters.''
Under the firefighter's rule for firefighters, it must first be determined whether
there is an "emergency situation." If there is none, the firefighter's rule does
not bar the negligence action. If there is an emergency, it is necessary to
determine whether one of the exceptions to the firefighter's rule applies, in
which case the firefighter can bring the negligence action. Under the
firefighter's rule for police officers, there is no need to determine if there is
an "emergency situation." If an exception applies, the rule does not bar the
negligence action.'0 2
Judge Grimm, concurring in the judgment, disagreed with the majority's
novel approach and found that the court was bound by the Krause formulation, which requires an "emergency situation."'0 3
IV. INSTANT DECISION
In Gray v. Russell, the Missouri Supreme Court began its analysis by
examining Missouri's development of the firefighter's rule, starting with
Anderson. The court said that although the Anderson and Nastasio decisions
seemed dispositive of this case, the possessor's duty of care owed to licensees
as announced in Anderson was altered in Wells v. Goforth." 4 Therefore, the
court said that "the law no longer holds the safety of gratuitous licensees in
disregard."'0 5 The court then looked at the firefighter's rule from a "more
general perspective," disregarding any notions of landowner liability.' 5

101. Id. at *1-2. The court did not specifically enact two rules, but did note that
the application of the firefighter's rule involving police officers has not rested so
heavily on emergency analysis.
Although it cited the California case in support of its new analysis, the Wagener
court failed to take advantage of the California rule that applied its test to both
firefighters and police officers:
[w]here the defendant's negligence, whether active or passive, creates an
apparent risk, which is of the type usually dealt with by firemen [or police
officers], and which is the cause of the fireman's [or police officer's]
presence, and which is the direct cause ofthe fireman's [or police officer's]
injury, the defendant is not liable ....
Rose v. City of Los Angeles, 206 Cal. Rptr. 49, 51 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984).
102. Note that the firefighter/officer must have been injured while performing his
duties for the rule to apply. Gray, 853 S.W.2d at 930.
103. Wagener, 1993 WL 98195, at *3.
104. Gray, 853 S.W.2d at 930 (citing Wells v. Goforth, 443 S.W.2d 155 (Mo.
1969)).
105. Gray, 853 S.W.2d at 930.

106. Id.
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The court subsequently framed its analysis in terms of the rescue
doctrine, stating that the firefighter's rule originated as a narrow exception to
this doctrine." 7 Reiterating Krause, the court highlighted the policy
considerations behind the rescue doctrine." 8 The court said that the rescue
doctrine is "'legal shorthand"' for proximate cause, and that, as a policy
choice, courts find rescue attempts to be foreseeable so that proximate cause
will not hinder an injured rescuer's attempt to recover. 0 9
For policy reasons, however, the court said that the benefits of this rescue
doctrine are withheld from public safety officers who are injured while
performing a rescue."' Again looking to Krause, the court explained that
because their jobs require them to confront dangers on behalf of the public,
these officers cannot recover for injuries attributable to the individual whose
negligence brought them to the scene of the emergency.''
Because
firefighters and police officers are hired, trained, and compensated to deal with
dangers that affect the public as a whole, the cost of their injuries should be
borne by the public as a whole through worker's compensation and insurance." 2 Again, the court found that this reasoning was the most persuasive
rationale for the firefighter's rule."'
Finally, the court reasoned that the aforementioned policy considerations
do not apply in nonemergency or nonrescue situations).' In such situations,
the court said that a public safety officer can choose not to proceed if the
apparent risks present unreasonable danger, and that public policy does not
require rules such as the rescue doctrine and the firefighter's rule in these
circumstances."' Furthermore, the Gray court did not desire to allow the
firefighter's rule to discriminate against public safety officers, or insulate
negligent individuals from liability in nonemergency or nonrescue situations." 6
The court finished where it began, holding that the firefighter's rule was

a narrow exception to the rescue doctrine." 7 As a result, the court
concluded that the firefighter's rule applied only in emergencies;" 8 when no

107. Id.

108. Id. at 930-31.
109. Id.

110. Id. at 931.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.

117. Id.
118. Id. at 930.
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emergency exists, traditional rules such as premises liability will define the

respective duties and liabilities of the parties." 9 Thus, Officer Gray's claims
were not barred by the firefighter's rule because he was injured during a

routine building check, not during an emergency. 2 '
V. COMMENT
The court's decision in Gray v. Russell, although on the one hand merely
a reassertion of prior law, successfully defeated attempts by the courts of
appeal to restructure firefighter rule analysis. By maintaining the status quo,
the court missed the opportunity to clarify and harmonize the rule and its
rationale. Consequently, the Missouri firefighter's rule remains a patchwork
of old and new law, containing doctrinal inconsistencies and superfluous
analysis.
A. The Emergency Requirement and DoctrinalInconsistencies
Before Gray, the Missouri Court of Appeals demonstrated a willingness
to disregard the emergency requirement, at least with respect to police
officers.'
In its place, the court looked to whether the risk encountered
was "one normally associated with the duty the officer was performing or the
reason for that officer's presence at the accident scene."'
By refusing to recognize such analysis, the Missouri Supreme Court

accomplished two possible objectives. First, the court maintained uniformity
and simplicity by declining to allow the creation of two firefighter's rules, as
sanctioned in Wagener." Second, rather than break new ground, the court
took the easy path and upheld the status quo. However, although preventing
the creation of two firefighter's rules worked to keep the rule uniform,
retaining the emergency requirement breeds confusion and inconsistency. 4

119. Id. at 931.
120. Id. at 930.
121. See supra notes 99-102 and accompanying text. The Wagener court made
a half-hearted compromise by eliminating the emergency requirement for police
officers and retaining it for firefighters. Wagener, 1993 WL 98195, at * 1-2.
122. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
123. See supra text accompanying notes 99-102. Regardless of the differences
between firefighters and police officers, a common firefighter's rule is appropriate
considering the similarities of these public safety officers. See Berko v. Freda, 459
A.2d 663, 666 (N.J. 1983) ("The similarity between firefighters and police officers
compels the extension of the rule to the latter. Both ... confront crises and ally
dangers created by an uncircumspect citizenry .... )
124. The requirement of an emergency only serves to create needless confusion
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol59/iss2/6
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In Gray, the Missouri Supreme Court reached its holding that the
firefighter's rule applies only in emergencies by framing the analysis in terms
of the rescue doctrine."z The court said that "[t]he reason for this particular
limitation is that the firefighter's rule originated as an exception to the 'rescue
doctrine' as noted in Nastasio."026 With this statement, the court created a
catastrophic confusion of the firefighter's rule and its rationales. First, this
assertion represents a misunderstanding of the legal history of the rule, both
in Missouri and in other jurisdictions. In Missouri, the firefighter's rule

originated as a landowner liability rule, not as an exception to the rescue
doctrine.12 7 Second, this quote by the court ignores the independence that
the firefighter's rule has assumed since its beginning.
Even in one of the first Missouri firefighter's rule cases, the Missouri
Supreme Court hinted that independent public policy rationales, not landowner
liability or the rescue doctrine, truly formed the basis for the rule. In
Nastasio, the plaintiff argued that the Anderson rule did not control because
it did not deal with a rescue doctrine claim; however, the court stated that
[tJhe same reasons, hereinafter stated, which cause us to hold
that the amended petition fails to state a claim for relief under
the "rescue doctrine" cause us also to hold that plaintiff's
deceased status under the law of Anderson
v. Cinnamon was that
28
of licensee and not that of invitee.1
In subsequent Missouri cases, the same firefighter's rule's independence
can be found in dicta. In Phillips, the Missouri Supreme Court first
emphasized the assumption of the risk and public policy justifications for the

by diverting our focus from the true issue in a firefighter rule case: whether the risk
encountered by the officers or firefighters is one that we should require them, as a
matter of law, to assume as incident to their duties as public safety officers. See
Flowers v. Sting Security, Inc., 488 A.2d 523, 532-33 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1985),
aff'd sub nom. Flowers v. Rock Creek Terrace Ltd. Partnership, 520 A.2d 361 (Md.
1987).
125. Gray, 853 S.W.2d at 930.
126. Id. Nowhere in Nastasio does it note that the firefighter's rule originated as
an exception to the rescue doctrine. The rule originated as a landowner liability
classification. See Anderson v. Cinnamon, 282 S.W.2d 445, 446-47 (Mo. 1955);
Gibson v. Leonard, 32 N.E. 182, 183-84 (Ill. 1892), overruled by Dini v. Naidotch,

170 N.E.2d 881 (Ill. 1960).
127. See Anderson, 282 S.W.2d at 446-47.
128. Nastasio v. Cinnamon, 295 S.W.2d 117, 119 (Mo. 1956) (emphasis added).
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rule,' and in Krause the court found that public policy
arguments were
"the most persuasive rationales" for the firefighter's rule. 30
Similarly, in other jurisdictions, the firefighter's rule exists independently
of landowner liability and the rescue doctrine. For example, in Berko v.
Freda,the New Jersey Supreme Court found that the rationale for the rescue
doctrine has no bearing on the firefighter's rule.13 '
Confronting the
firefighter's rule as an issue of first impression, the Iowa Supreme Court
recently adopted the rule stating that "public policy supports adoption of a
narrow rule denying recovery to a firefighter and policeman."' 32 Such
jurisdictions no longer formulate their rule upon underpinnings such as
landowner liability and the rescue doctrine,33 and thus do not require an
emergency for the firefighter's rule to apply.
Furthermore, if proximate cause and the rescue doctrine represent policy
choices in and of themselves, 3 1 then it seems odd that the firefighter's rule
could not exist independently of the rescue doctrine and rest upon the more
modem and persuasivejustifications. Therefore, if the rescue doctrine has lost
its importance and the rule is now independently based upon public policy and
assumption of risk, the requirement of an "emergency situation" is no longer
necessary, and this requirement is inconsistent with the justifications for the
rule.
B. Life Without the Emergency Requirement

35

Once the firefighter's rule broke loose from its landowner liability
moorings, the Missouri Supreme Court either had to abrogate the rule 36 or
"look[] elsewhere for a rationale" to support it. 37 The Phillips court
decided not to abrogate the rule and found public policy and assumption of

129. Phillips v. Hallmark Cards, Inc., 722 S.W.2d 86, 88 (Mo. 1986) (citing
Flowers, 488 A.2d at 534).
130. Krause v. U.S. Truck Company, 787 S.W.2d 708, 712 (Mo. 1990).
131. Berko v. Freda, 459 A.2d 663, 667 n.2 (N.J. 1983).
132. Pottebaum v. Hinds, 347 N.W.2d 642 (Iowa 1984).
133. See id.
at 645 ("While we do not ascribe to all of the various policy reasons
espoused in support of the fireman's rule [i.e. landowner liability and assumption of
risk], we do believe adoption of a limited rule is sound. In particular, we agree with
the New Jersey Supreme Court [in Berko] .... "). See also Flowers, 488 A.2d at 53237.
134. See supra notes 38-31 and accompanying text.
135. To this author's knowledge, Missouri is the only state with an emergency
requirement in its firefighter's rule.
136. See Phillips, 722 S.W.2d at 89.
137. Krause, 787 S.W.2d at 711.
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risk to be good supporting rationales.' 38 Krause and Gray reaffirmed these
modem underpinnings; however, reminiscent of the rescue doctrine, the court
added an emergency element to the rule, never before seen in its prior
As demonstrated by other jurisdictions, this emergency
decisions.'"
requirement is unnecessary.
Emergency analysis attempts to distinguish and sort out those cases in
which the firefighter or police officer should recover for acts of negligence
from those cases in which the officer should be barred from recovering.
However, an identical sorting process would occur, regardless of any inquiry

into emergency analysis, by utilizing the already existing exceptions to the
40

firefighter's rule, specifically the independent and separate acts exception.
The case of Rose v. City of Los Angeles contains an excellent sampling
of California cases in which it could be said that no "emergency" existed, but
in which courts found the firefighter's rule inapplicable because of the
independent and separate acts exception.' In one example, a police officer
was struck by a speeding vehicle while placing a ticket on an illegally parked
car. The court said that because of the independent and separate act of
negligent speeding, the officer could maintain an action against the speeder,
but not against the owner of the illegally parked car.'42 In another case, an
officer pulled over two speeding vehicles, and, while sitting in his parked car
at the side of the road, one of the drivers stepped on the clutch instead of the
brake and hit the officer's car. 43 Similarly, this court held this to be a
separate and independent negligent act, since the driver's inexperience with
driving a car with manual transmission was not a risk normally associated
with apprehending speeders, nor was it the reason for the officer's presence
at the scene.'" Several other similar cases are cited in Rose that reach the
same result as these two examples.'45
By focusing on the risks normally associated with firefighting and police
activities as well as the officer's purpose for being on the scene, not only will
a court remain true to the modem underpinnings of the rule, but it will also
achieve the same result as if it had used emergency analysis.
Furthermore, eliminating the emergency requirement eliminates a layer
of analysis and simplifies firefighter rule cases. Under Gray,there are several
threshold issues that have to be examined: First, was the public safety officer

138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.

Phillips, 722 S.W.2d at 88-89.
Gray, 853 S.W.2d at 930.
See supra text accompanying notes 93-94.
Rose v. City of Los Angeles, 206 Cal. Rptr. 49, 51-52 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984).
Id. at 51 (citing Hubbard v. Boelt, 620 P.2d 156 (Cal. 1980)).
Id. (citing Malo v. Willis, 178 Cal. Rptr. 774 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981)).
Id.
Id. at 52.
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injured while performing firefighter/police officer duties? Second, was there
an emergency? Third, did the ordinary negligence of the defendant create the
emergency? Without the emergency requirement, only the first question
would be necessary. Then, examining the separate and independent acts
exception, one can sort out a recoverable firefighter claim from a nonrecoverable one.
VI. CONCLUSION
In Gray v. Russell the Missouri Supreme Court had the opportunity to
support the firefighter's rule with modem justifications as well as the
opportunity to expand the scope of the rule. The court chose to remain
consistent with past precedent and retain the firefighter's rule as a very narrow
exception to the rescue doctrine. With this choice, the court failed to reap the
benefits of doctrinal consistency and increased simplicity.

CHRISTOPHER M. HoHN
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